8. Applying SPARK in Practice¶
SPARK tools offer different levels of analysis, which are relevant in different contexts. This section starts with a description of the five Levels of Software Assurance that can be achieved with SPARK. It continues with a description of the main Objectives of Using SPARK. This list gathers the most commonly found reasons for adopting SPARK in industrial projects, but it is not intended to be an exhaustive list.
Whatever the objective(s) of using SPARK, any project fits in one of four possible Project Scenarios:
the brown field scenario: Maintenance and Evolution of Existing Ada Software
the green field scenario: New Developments in SPARK
the migration scenario: Conversion of Existing SPARK Software to SPARK 2014
the frozen scenario: Analysis of Frozen Ada Software
The end of this section examines each of these scenarios in turn and describes how SPARK can be applied in each case.
8.1. Levels of Software Assurance¶
SPARK analysis can give strong guarantees that a program:
does not read uninitialized data,
accesses global data only as intended,
does not contain concurrency errors (deadlocks and data races),
does not contain run-time errors (e.g., division by zero or buffer overflow),
respects key integrity properties (e.g., interaction between components or global invariants),
is a correct implementation of software requirements expressed as contracts.
SPARK can analyze either a complete program or those parts that are marked as being subject to analysis, but it can only be applied to code that follows some restrictions designed to facilitate formal verification. In particular, handling of exceptions is not allowed and use of pointers should follow a strict ownership policy aiming at preventing aliasing of data allocated in the heap (pointers to the stack are not allowed). Pointers and exceptions are both features that, if supported completely, make formal verification, as done by SPARK, infeasible, either because of limitations of state-of-the-art technology or because of the disproportionate effort required from users to apply formal verification in such situations. The large subset of Ada that is analyzed by SPARK is also called the SPARK language subset.
SPARK builds on the strengths of Ada to provide even more guarantees statically rather than dynamically. As summarized in the following table, Ada provides strict syntax and strong typing at compile time plus dynamic checking of run-time errors and program contracts. SPARK allows such checking to be performed statically. In addition, it enforces the use of a safer language subset and detects data flow errors statically.
dynamic / static
dynamic / static
Data flow errors
Safer language subset
Strict clear syntax
The main benefit of formal program verification as performed by SPARK is that it allows verifying properties that are difficult or very costly to verify by other methods, such as testing or reviews. That difficulty may stem from the complexity of the software, the complexity of the requirements, and/or the unknown capabilities of attackers. Formal verification allows giving guarantees that some properties are always verified, however complex the context. The latest versions of international certification standards for avionics (DO-178C / ED-12C) and railway systems (CENELEC EN 50128:2011) have recognized these benefits by increasing the role that formal methods can play in the development and verification of critical software.
8.1.1. Levels of SPARK Use¶
The scope and level of SPARK analysis depend on the objectives being pursued by the adoption of SPARK. The scope of analysis may be the totality of a project, only some units, or only parts of units. The level of analysis may range from simple guarantees provided by flow analysis to complex properties being proved. These can be divided into five easily remembered levels:
Stone level - valid SPARK
Bronze level - initialization and correct data flow
Silver level - absence of run-time errors (AoRTE)
Gold level - proof of key integrity properties
Platinum level - full functional proof of requirements
Platinum level is defined here for completeness, but it is seldom applicable due to the high cost of achieving it. Each level builds on the previous one, so that the code subject to the Gold level should be a subset of the code subject to Silver level, which itself is a subset of the code subject to Bronze level, which is in general the same as the code subject to Stone level. We advise using:
Stone level only as an intermediate level during adoption,
Bronze level for as large a part of the code as possible,
Silver level as the default target for critical software (subject to costs and limitations),
Gold level only for a subset of the code subject to specific key integrity (safety/security) properties,
Platinum level only for those parts of the code with the highest integrity (safety/security) constraints.
Our starting point is a program in Ada, which could be thought of as the Brick level: thanks to the use of Ada programming language, this level already provides some confidence: it is the highest level in The Three Little Pigs fable! And indeed languages with weaker semantics could be thought of as Straw and Sticks levels. However, the adoption of SPARK allows us to get stronger guarantees, should the wolf in the fable adopt more aggressive means of attack than simply blowing.
A pitfall when using tools for automating human tasks is to end up “pleasing the tools” rather than working around the tool limitations. Both flow analysis and proof, the two technologies used in SPARK, have known limitations. Users should refrain from changing the program for the benefit of only getting fewer messages from the tools. When relevant, users should justify tool messages through appropriate pragmas. See the sections on Suppressing Warnings and Justifying Check Messages for more details.
GNATprove can be run at the different levels mentioned in this document, either through the Integrated Development Environments (IDE) Eclipse (GNATbench plugin) or GNAT Studio, or on the command line. Use of the command-line interface at a given level is facilitated by convenient synonyms:
--mode=stonefor Stone level (synonym of
--mode=bronzefor Bronze level (synonym of
--mode=silverfor Silver level (synonym of
--mode=goldfor Gold level (synonym of
Note that levels Silver and Gold are activated with the same switches. Indeed, the difference between these levels is not on how GNATprove is run, but on the objectives of verification. This is explained in the section on Gold Level. Platinum level is not given a separate switch value, as it would be the same.
Benefits - What is gained from adopting SPARK?
Impact on Process - How should the process (i.e., the software life cycle development and verification activities) be adapted to use SPARK?
Costs and Limitations - What are the main costs and limitations for adopting SPARK?
Additionally, the index of this document contains entries for all levels (from Stone level to Platinum level) which point to parts of the User’s Guide relevant for reaching a specific level.
8.1.2. Stone Level - Valid SPARK¶
The goal of reaching this level is to identify as much code as possible as
belonging to the SPARK subset. The user is responsible for identifying
candidate SPARK code by applying the marker
SPARK_Mode to flag SPARK code to GNATprove, which is responsible for
checking that the code marked with
SPARK_Mode is indeed valid SPARK
code. Note that valid SPARK code may still be incorrect in many ways, such as
raising run-time exceptions. Being valid merely means that the code respects
the legality rules that define the SPARK subset in the SPARK Reference Manual
(see http://docs.adacore.com/spark2014-docs/html/lrm/). The number of lines of
SPARK code in a program can be computed (along with other metrics such as the
total number of lines of code) by the metrics computation tool GNATmetric.
The stricter SPARK rules are enforced on a (hopefully) large part of the program, which leads to higher quality and maintainability, as error-prone features such as side-effects in functions are avoided, and others, such as use of pointers to the stack, are isolated to non-SPARK parts of the program. Individual and peer review processes can be reduced on the SPARK parts of the program, since analysis automatically eliminates some categories of defects. The parts of the program that don’t respect the SPARK rules are carefully isolated so they can be more thoroughly reviewed and tested.
Impact on Process
After the initial pass of applying the SPARK rules to the program, ongoing maintenance of SPARK code is similar to ongoing maintenance of Ada code, with a few additional rules, such as the need to avoid side effects in functions. These additional rules are checked automatically by running GNATprove on the modified program, which can be done either by the developer before committing changes or by an automatic system (continuous builder, regression testsuite, etc.)
Costs and Limitations
Pointer-heavy code needs to be rewritten to follow the ownership policy or to hide pointers from SPARK analysis, which may be difficult. The initial pass may require large, but shallow, rewrites in order to transform the code, for example to rewrite functions with side effects into procedures.
8.1.3. Bronze Level - Initialization and Correct Data Flow¶
The goal of reaching this level is to make sure that no uninitialized data can ever be read and, optionally, to prevent unintended access to global variables. This also ensures no possible interference between parameters and global variables; i.e., the same variable isn’t passed multiple times to a subprogram, either as a parameter or global variable.
The SPARK code is guaranteed to be free from a number of defects: no reads of uninitialized variables, no possible interference between parameters and global variables, no unintended access to global variables.
Global contracts are used to specify which global variables are read
and/or written by subprograms, maintenance is facilitated by a clear
documentation of intent. This is checked automatically by GNATprove,
so that any mismatch between the implementation and the specification is
Impact on Process
An initial pass is required where flow analysis is enabled and the resulting messages are resolved either by rewriting code or justifying any false alarms. Once this is complete, ongoing maintenance can preserve the same guarantees at a low cost. A few simple idioms can be used to avoid most false alarms, and the remaining false alarms can be easily justified.
Costs and Limitations
The initial pass may require a substantial effort to deal with the false alarms, depending on the coding style adopted up to that point. The analysis may take a long time, up to an hour on large programs, but it is guaranteed to terminate. Flow analysis is, by construction, limited to local understanding of the code, with no knowledge of values (only code paths) and handling of composite variables is only through calls, rather than component by component, which may lead to false alarms.
8.1.4. Silver Level - Absence of Run-time Errors (AoRTE)¶
The goal of this level is to ensure that the program does not raise an
exception at run time. Among other things, this guarantees that the control
flow of the program cannot be circumvented by exploiting a buffer overflow,
or integer overflow. This also ensures that
the program cannot crash or behave erratically when compiled without
support for run-time checking (compiler switch
-gnatp) because of
operations that would have triggered a run-time exception.
GNATprove can be used to prove the complete absence of possible run-time
errors corresponding to the explicit raising of exceptions in the
program, raising the exception
Constraint_Error at run time, and
failures of assertions (corresponding to raising exception
A special kind of run-time error that can be proved at this level is the
absence of exceptions from defensive code. This requires users to add
subprogram preconditions (see section Preconditions for details) that
correspond to the conditions checked in defensive code. For example, defensive
code that checks the range of inputs is modeled by a precondition of the
Input_X in Low_Bound .. High_Bound. These conditions are then checked by
GNATprove at each call.
The SPARK code is guaranteed to be free from run-time errors (Absence of Run Time Errors - AoRTE) plus all the defects already detected at Bronze level: no reads of uninitialized variables, no possible interference between parameters and/or global variables, and no unintended access to global variables. Thus, the quality of the program can be guaranteed to achieve higher levels of integrity than would be possible in other programming languages.
All the messages about possible run-time errors can be carefully reviewed and justified (for example by relying on external system constraints such as the maximum time between resets) and these justifications can be later reviewed as part of quality inspections.
The proof of AoRTE can be used to compile the final executable without
run-time exceptions (compiler switch
-gnatp), which results in very
efficient code comparable to what can be achieved in C or assembly.
The proof of AoRTE can be used to comply with the objectives of certification standards in various domains (DO-178B/C in avionics, EN 50128 in railway, IEC 61508 in many safety-related industries, ECSS-Q-ST-80C in space, IEC 60880 in nuclear, IEC 62304 in medical, ISO 26262 in automotive). To date, the use of SPARK has been qualified in an EN 50128 context. Qualification plans for DO-178 have been developed by AdaCore. Qualification material in any context can be developed by AdaCore as part of a contract.
Impact on Process
An initial pass is required where proof of AoRTE is applied to the program, and the resulting messages are resolved by either rewriting code or justifying any false alarms. Once this is complete, as for the Bronze level, ongoing maintenance can retain the same guarantees at reasonable cost. Using precise types and simple subprogram contracts (preconditions and postconditions) is sufficient to avoid most false alarms, and any remaining false alarms can be easily justified.
Special treatment is required for loops, which may need the addition of loop invariants to prove AoRTE inside and after the loop. The detailed process for adding loop contracts is described in How to Write Loop Invariants, as well as examples of common patterns of loops and their corresponding loop invariants.
Costs and Limitations
The initial pass may require a substantial effort to resolve all false alarms, depending on the coding style adopted previously. The analysis may take a long time, up to a few hours, on large programs but is guaranteed to terminate. Proof is, by construction, limited to local understanding of the code, which requires using sufficiently precise types of variables, and some preconditions and postconditions on subprograms to communicate relevant properties to their callers.
Even if a property is provable, automatic provers may nevertheless not be able to prove it, due to limitations of the heuristic techniques used in automatic provers. In practice, these limitations mostly show up on non-linear integer arithmetic (such as division and modulo) and floating-point arithmetic.
8.1.5. Gold Level - Proof of Key Integrity Properties¶
The goal of the Gold level is to ensure key integrity properties such as maintaining critical data invariants throughout execution and guaranteeing that transitions between states follow a specified safety automaton. Typically these properties derive from software requirements. Together with the Silver level, these goals ensure program integrity, that is, the program executes within safe boundaries: the control flow of the program is correctly programmed and cannot be circumvented through run-time errors and data cannot be corrupted.
SPARK has a number of useful features for specifying both data invariants and control flow constraints:
Type Predicates reflect properties that should always be true of any object of the type.
Preconditions reflect properties that should always hold on subprogram entry.
Postconditions reflect properties that should always hold on subprogram exit.
These features can be verified statically by running GNATprove in proof mode, similarly to what was done at the Silver level. At every point where a violation of the property may occur, GNATprove issues either an ‘info’ message, verifying that the property always holds, or a ‘check’ message about a possible violation. Of course, a benefit of proving properties is that they don’t need to be tested, which can be used to reduce or completely eliminate unit testing.
These features can also be used to augment integration testing with dynamic
verification of key integrity properties. To enable
this additional verification during execution, you can use either the
-gnata (which enables verification of all invariants and
contracts at run time) or
pragma Assertion_Policy (which enables a subset
of the verification) either inside the code (so that it applies to the
code that follows in the current unit) or in a pragma configuration file
(so that it applies to the entire program).
The SPARK code is guaranteed to respect key integrity properties as well as being free from all the defects already detected at the Bronze and Silver levels: no reads of uninitialized variables, no possible interference between parameters and global variables, no unintended access to global variables, and no run-time errors. This is a unique feature of SPARK that is not found in other programming languages. In particular, such guarantees may be used in a safety case to make reliability claims.
The effort in achieving this level of confidence based on proof is relatively low compared to the effort required to achieve the same level based on testing. Indeed, confidence based on testing has to rely on an extensive testing strategy. Certification standards define criteria for approaching comprehensive testing, such as Modified Condition / Decision Coverage (MC/DC), which are expensive to achieve. Some certification standards allow the use of proof as a replacement for certain forms of testing, in particular DO-178C in avionics, EN 50128 in railway and IEC 61508 for functional safety. Obtaining proofs, as done in SPARK, can thus be used as a cost-effective alternative to unit testing.
Impact on Process
In a high-DAL certification context where proof replaces testing and independence is required between certain development/verification activities, one person can define the architecture and low-level requirements (package specs) and another person can develop the corresponding bodies and use GNATprove for verification. Using a common syntax/semantics – contracts – for both the specs/requirements and the code facilitates communication between the two activities and makes it easier for the same person(s) to play different roles at different times.
Depending on the complexity of the property being proven, it may be more or less costly to add the necessary contracts on types and subprograms and to achieve complete automatic proof by interacting with the tool. This typically requires some experience with the tool, which can be gained by training and practice. Thus not all developers should be tasked with developing such contracts and proofs, but instead a few developers should be designated for this task.
As with the proof of AoRTE at Silver level, special treatment is required for loops, such as the addition of loop invariants to prove properties inside and after the loop. Details are presented in How to Write Loop Invariants, as well as examples of common patterns of loops and their corresponding loop invariants.
Costs and Limitations
The analysis may take a long time, up to a few hours, on large programs, but it is guaranteed to terminate. It may also take more or less time depending on the proof strategy adopted (as indicated by the switches passed to GNATprove). Proof is, by construction, limited to local understanding of the code, which requires using sufficiently precise types of variables and some preconditions and postconditions on subprograms to communicate relevant properties to their callers.
Even if a property is provable, automatic provers may fail to prove it due to limitations of the heuristic techniques they employ. In practice, these limitations are mostly visible on non-linear integer arithmetic (such as division and modulo) and on floating-point arithmetic.
Some properties might not be easily expressible in the form of data invariants and subprogram contracts, for example properties of execution traces or temporal properties. Other properties may require the use of non-intrusive instrumentation in the form of ghost code.
8.1.6. Platinum Level - Full Functional Correctness¶
Platinum level is achieved when contracts fully cover the functional requirements. Achieving the Platinum level is rare in itself, and usually done for small parts of an application. The Examples in the Toolset Distribution contain many such examples of proof at Platinum level, both as Individual Subprograms and as Single Units.
The SPARK code is guaranteed to correctly implement its specification, including being free from all the defects already detected at the Bronze, Silver and Gold levels. These strong guarantees can be used as arguments in a safety/security case for the overall software system, providing steps are taken for Managing Assumptions.
Impact on Process
The impact on process is mostly the same as for Gold level. When manual proof is used, which is very likely at this level, there is an associated activity to maintain these proofs as the code evolves. Typically a dedicated verification engineer with enough experience of formal program verification in SPARK should be tasked with this activity.
Costs and Limitations
These are the same as for Gold level, plus the cost of applying manual proof more systematically. Depending on the manual proof technique used and the complexity of the proof, this might be more or less costly initially and during maintenance:
Manual Proof Using SPARK Lemma Library is the least costly of all, only requiring to use the right lemma from the library.
Manual Proof Using Ghost Code is more costly, as it requires expertise and interactions with the tool to guide automatic provers.
While the use of manual proof allows to prove any provable property in principle, a balance needs to be found between the higher cost of manual proof techniques and the benefits they bring compared to testing or manual justification.
8.2. Objectives of Using SPARK¶
8.2.1. Safe Coding Standard for Critical Software¶
SPARK is a subset of Ada meant for formal verification, by excluding features that are difficult or impossible to analyze automatically. This means that SPARK can also be used as a coding standard to restrict the set of features used in critical software. As a safe coding standard checker, SPARK allows both to prevent the introduction of errors by excluding unsafe Ada features, and it facilitates their early detection with GNATprove’s flow analysis.
22.214.171.124. Exclusion of Unsafe Ada Features¶
Once the simple task of Identifying SPARK Code has been completed, one
can use GNATprove in
check mode to verify that SPARK restrictions are
respected in SPARK code. Here we list some of the most error-prone Ada
features that are excluded from SPARK (see Excluded Ada Features for
the complete list).
All expressions, including function calls, are free of side-effects. Expressions with side-effects are problematic because they hide interactions that occur in the code, in the sense that a computation will not only produce a value but also modify some hidden state in the program. In the worst case, they may even introduce interferences between subexpressions of a common expression, which results in different executions depending on the order of evaluation of subexpressions chosen by the compiler.
Handling of exceptions is not permitted. Exception handling can create complex and invisible control flows in a program, which increases the likelihood of introducing errors during maintenance. What is more, when an exception is raised, subprograms that are terminated abnormally leave their variables in a possibly uninitialized or inconsistent state, in which data invariants may be broken. This includes values of out parameters, which additionally are not copied back when passed by copy, thus introducing a dependency on the parameter mode chosen by the compiler.
The use of access types and allocators is restricted to pool specific access types and subjected to an ownership policy ensuring that a mutable memory cell has a single owner. In general, pointers can introduce aliasing, that is, they can allow the same object to be visible through different names at the same program point. This makes it difficult to reason about a program as modifying the object under one of the names will also modify the other names. What is more, access types come with their own load of common mistakes, like double frees and dangling pointers.
SPARK also prevents dependencies on the elaboration order by ensuring that no package can write into variables declared in other packages during its elaboration. The use of controlled types is also forbidden as they lead to insertions of implicit calls by the compiler. Finally, backward goto statements are not permitted as they obfuscate the control flow.
126.96.36.199. Early Detection of Errors¶
GNATprove’s flow analysis will find all the occurrences of the following errors:
uses of uninitialized variables (see Data Initialization Policy)
aliasing of parameters that can cause interferences, which are often not accounted for by programmers (see Absence of Interferences)
It will also warn systematically about the following suspicious behaviors:
wrong parameter modes (can hurt readability and maintainability or even be the sign of a bug, for example if the programmer forgot to update a parameter, to read the value of an out parameter, or to use the initial value of a parameter)
unused variables or statements (again, can hurt readability and maintainability or even be the sign of a bug)
8.2.2. Prove Absence of Run-Time Errors (AoRTE)¶
188.8.131.52. With Proof Only¶
GNATprove can be used to prove the complete absence of possible run-time errors corresponding to:
all possible explicit raising of exceptions in the program,
Constraint_Errorat run time, and
all possible failures of assertions corresponding to raising exception
Assert_Errorat run time.
AoRTE is important for ensuring safety in all possible operational conditions for safety-critical software (including boundary conditions, or abnormal conditions) or for ensuring availability of a service (absence of DOS attack that can crash the software).
When run-time checks are enabled during execution, Ada programs are not vulnerable to the kind of attacks like buffer overflows that plague programs in C and C++, which allow attackers to gain control over the system. But in the case where run-time checks are disabled (in general for efficiency, but it could be for other reasons), proving their absence with GNATprove also prevents such attacks. This is specially important for ensuring security when some inputs may have been crafted by an attacker.
Few subprogram contracts (Preconditions and Postconditions) are needed in general to prove AoRTE, far fewer than for proving functional properties. Even fewer subprogram contracts are needed if types are suitably constrained with Type Contracts. Typically, 95% to 98% of run-time checks can be proved automatically, and the remaining checks can be either verified with manual provers or justified by manual analysis.
GNATprove supports this type of combination of results in the summary table of The Analysis Results Summary File. Multiple columns display the number of checks automatically verified, while the column Justified displays the number of checks manually justified. The column Unproved should be empty for all checks to be verified.
184.108.40.206. With a Combination of Proof and Test¶
It is not always possible to achieve 100% proof of AoRTE, for multiple reasons:
Formal verification is only applicable to the part of the program that is in SPARK. If the program includes parts in Ada that are not in SPARK, for example, then it is not possible to prove AoRTE on those parts.
Some run-time checks may not be proved automatically due to prover shortcomings (see Investigating Prover Shortcomings for details).
It may not be cost-effective to add the required contracts for proving AoRTE in a less critical part of the code, compared to using testing as a means of verification.
For all these reasons, it is important to be able to combine the results of formal verification and testing on different parts of a codebase. Formal verification works by making some assumptions, and these assumptions should be shown to hold even when formal verification and testing are combined. Certainly, formal verification cannot guarantee the same properties when part of a program is only tested, as when all of a program is proved. The goal then, when combining formal verification and testing, is to reach a level of confidence as good as the level reached by testing alone.
At the Level of Individual Run-Time Checks¶
One way to get confidence that unproved run-time checks cannot fail during execution is to exercise them during testing. Test coverage information allows guaranteeing a set of run-time checks have been executed successfully during a test run. This coverage information may be gathered from the execution of a unit testing campaign, an integration testing campaign, or the execution of a dedicated testsuite focussing on exercising the run-time checks (for example on boundary values or random ones).
This strategy is already applied in other static analysis tools, for example in the integration between the CodePeer static analyzer and the VectorCAST testing tool for Ada programs.
Between Proof and Integration Testing¶
Contracts can also be exercised dynamically during integration testing. In cases where unit testing is not required (either because proof has been applied to all subprograms, or because the verification context allows it), exercising contracts during integration testing can complement proof results, by giving the assurance that the actual compiled program behaves as expected.
This strategy has been applied at Altran on UK military projects submitted to Def Stan 00-56 certification: AoRTE was proved on all the code, and contracts were exercised during integration testing, which allowed to scrap unit testing.
Between Proof and Unit Testing¶
Contracts on subprograms provide a natural boundary for combining proof and test:
If proof is used to demonstrate that a subprogram is free of run-time errors and respects its contract, this proof depends on the precondition of the subprogram being respected at the call site. This verification can be achieved by proving the caller too, or by checking dynamically the precondition of the called subprogram during unit testing of the caller.
If proof is used to demonstrate that a subprogram is free of run-time errors and respects its contract, and this subprogram calls other subprograms, this proof depends on the postconditions of the called subprogram being respected at call sites. This verification can be achieved by proving the callees too, or by checking dynamically the postcondition of the called subprograms during their unit testing.
Thus, it is possible to combine freely subprograms that are proved and
subprograms that are unit tested, provided subprogram contracts
(Preconditions and Postconditions) are exercised during unit
testing. This can be achieved by compiling the program with assertions for
testing (for example with switch
-gnata in GNAT), or by using
GNATtest to create the test harness (see section 7.10.12 of GNAT User’s
Guide on Testing with Contracts).
When combining proof and test on individual subprograms, one should make sure that the assumptions made for proof are justified at the boundary between proved subprograms and tested subprograms (see section on Managing Assumptions). To help with this verification, special switches are defined in GNAT to add run-time checks that verify dynamically the assumptions made during proof:
-gnateAadds checks that parameters are not aliased
-gnateVadds checks that parameters are valid, including parameters of composite types (arrays, records)
-gnatVaadds checks that objects are valid at more places than -gnateV, but only for scalar objects
This strategy is particularly well suited in the context of the DO-178C certification standard in avionics, which explicitly allows proof or test to be used as verification means on each module.
8.2.3. Prove Correct Integration Between Components¶
220.127.116.11. Correct Integration In New Developments¶
GNATprove can be used to prove correct integration between components, where a component could be a subprogram, a unit or a set of units. Indeed, even if components are verified individually (for example by proof or test or a combination thereof), their combination may still fail because of unforeseen interactions or design problems.
SPARK is ideally equipped to support such analysis, with its detailed Subprogram Contracts:
With Data Dependencies, a user can specify exactly the input and output data of a subprogram, which goes a long way towards uncovering unforeseen interactions.
With functional contracts (Preconditions and Postconditions), a user can specify precisely properties about the behavior of the subprogram that are relevant for component integration. In general, simple contracts are needed for component integration, which means that they are easy to write and to verify automatically. See section on Writing Contracts for Program Integrity for examples of such contracts.
When using data dependencies, GNATprove’s flow analysis is sufficient to check correct integration between components. When using functional contracts, GNATprove’s proof should also be applied.
18.104.22.168. In Replacement of Comments¶
It is good practice to specify properties of a subprogram that are important for integration in the comments that are attached to the subprogram declaration.
Comments can be advantageously replaced by contracts:
Comments about the domain of the subprogram can be replaced by Preconditions.
Comments about the result of functions can be replaced by Postconditions.
GNATprove can use the contracts to prove correct integration between components, as in new developments.
Contracts are less ambiguous than comments, and can be accompanied by (or interspersed with) higher level comments that need not be focused on the finer grain details of which variables must have which values, as these are already specified concisely and precisely in the contracts.
22.214.171.124. In Replacement of Defensive Coding¶
In existing Ada code that is migrated to SPARK, defensive coding is typically used to verify the correct integration between components: checks are made at the start of a subprogram that inputs (parameters and global variables) satisfy expected properties, and an exception is raised or the program halted if an unexpected situation is found.
Defensive code can be advantageously replaced by preconditions:
The dynamic checks performed by defensive code at run time can be performed equally by preconditions, and they can be enabled at a much finer grain thanks to Pragma Assertion_Policy.
GNATprove can use the preconditions to prove correct integration between components, as in new developments.
8.2.4. Prove Functional Correctness¶
126.96.36.199. Functional Correctness In New Developments¶
GNATprove can be used to prove functional correctness of an implementation against its specification. This strongest level of verification can be applied either to specific subprograms, or specific units, or the complete program. For those subprograms whose functional correctness is to be checked, the user should:
use GNATprove to prove automatically that most checks (including contracts) always hold; and
address the remaining unproved checks with manual justifications or testing, as already discussed in the section on how to Prove Absence of Run-Time Errors (AoRTE).
As more complex contracts are required in general, it is expected that achieving that strongest level of verification is also more costly than proving absence of run-time errors. Typically, SPARK features like Quantified Expressions and Expression Functions are needed to express the specification, and features like Loop Invariants are needed to achieve automatic proof. See section on Writing Contracts for Functional Correctness for examples of such contracts, and section on How to Write Loop Invariants for examples of the required loop invariants.
When the functional specification is expressed as a set of disjoint cases, the SPARK feature of Contract Cases can be used to increase readability and to provide an automatic means to verify that cases indeed define a partitioning of the possible operational contexts.
188.8.131.52. In Replacement of Unit Testing¶
In existing Ada code that is migrated to SPARK, unit testing is typically used to verify functional correctness: actual outputs obtained when calling the subprogram are compared to expected outputs for given inputs. A test case defines an expected behavior to verify; a test procedure implements a test case with specific given inputs and expected outputs.
Test cases can be used as a basis for functional contracts, as they define in general a behavior for a set of similar inputs. Thus, a set of test cases can be transformed into Contract Cases, where each case corresponds to a test case: the test input constraint becomes the guard of the corresponding case, while the test output constraint becomes the consequence of the corresponding case.
GNATprove can be used to prove this initial functional contract, as in new developments. Then, cases can be progressively generalized (by relaxing the conditions in the guards), or new cases added to the contract, until the full functional behavior of the subprogram is specified and proved.
8.2.5. Ensure Correct Behavior of Parameterized Software¶
In some domains (railway, space), it is common to develop software which depends on parameterization data, which changes from mission to mission. For example, the layout of railroads or the characteristics of the payload for a spacecraft are mission specific, but in general do not require developing completely new software for the mission. Instead, the software may either depend on data definition units which are subject to changes between missions, or the software may load at starting time (possibly during elaboration in Ada) the data which defines the characteristics of the mission. Then, the issue is that a verification performed on a specific version of the software (for a given parameterization) is not necessarily valid for all versions of the software. In general, this means that verification has to be performed again for each new version of the software, which can be costly.
SPARK provides a better solution to ensure correct behavior of the software for all possible parameterizations. It requires defining a getter function for every variable or constant in the program that represents an element of parameterization, and calling this getter function instead of reading the variable or constant directly. Because GNATprove performs an analysis based on contracts, all that is known at analysis time about the value returned by a getter function is what is available from its signature and contract. Typically, one may want to use Scalar Ranges or Predicates to constrain the return subtype of such getter functions, to reflect the operational constraints respected by all parameterizations.
This technique ensures that the results of applying GNATprove are valid not only for the version of the software analyzed, but for any other version that satisfies the same operational constraints. This is valid whatever the objective(s) pursued with the use of SPARK: Prove Absence of Run-Time Errors (AoRTE), Prove Correct Integration Between Components, Prove Functional Correctness, etc.
It may be the case that changing constants into functions makes the code
illegal because the constants were used in representation clauses that require
static values. In that case, compilation switch
-gnatI should be specified
when analyzing the modified code with GNATprove, so that representation
clauses are ignored. As representation clauses have no effect on GNATprove’s
analysis, and their validity is checked by GNAT when compiling the
original code, the formal verification results are valid for the original code.
For constants of a non-scalar type (for example, constants of record or array
type), an alternative way to obtain a similar result as the getter function is
to define the constant as a deferred constant, whose initial declaration in the
visible part of a package spec does not specify the value of the
constant. Then, the private part of the package spec which defines the
completion of the deferred constant must be marked
SPARK_Mode => Off, so
that clients of the package only see the visible constant declaration without
value. In such a case, the analysis of client units with GNATprove is valid
for all possible values of the constant.
8.2.6. Safe Optimization of Run-Time Checks¶
Enabling run-time checks in a program usually increases the running time by
around 10%. This may not fit the timing schedule in some highly constrained
applications. In some cases where a piece of code is called a large number of
times (for example in a loop), enabling run-time checks on that piece of code
may increase the running time by far more than 10%. Thus, it may be tempting to
remove run-time checking in the complete program (with compilation switch
-gnatp) or a selected piece of code (with pragma
Suppress), for the
purpose of decreasing running time. The problem with that approach is that the
program is not protected anymore against programming mistakes (for safety) or
attackers (for security).
GNATprove provides a better solution, by allowing users to prove the absence
of all run-time errors (or run-time errors of a specific kind, for example
overflow checks) in a piece of code, provided the assumptions on which their
proof relies are respected. This includes in particular the fact that the
precondition of the enclosing subprogram is respected. Then, all run-time
checks (or run-time errors of a specific kind) can be suppressed in that piece
of code using pragma
Suppress, knowing that they will never fail at run
time, provided the corresponding assumptions are checked. For example, this can
be done for the precondition of the enclosing subprogram by using Pragma Assertion_Policy. For more details, see Choosing Which Run-time Checking to Keep. By replacing many checks with a few checks, we can decrease the
running time of the application by doing safe and controlled optimization of
8.2.7. Address Data and Control Coupling¶
As defined in the avionics standard DO-178, data coupling is “The dependence of a software component on data not exclusively under the control of that software component” and control coupling is “The manner or degree by which one software component influences the execution of another software component”, where a software component could be a subprogram, a unit or a set of units.
Although analysis of data and control coupling are not performed at the same level of details in non-critical domains, knowledge of data and control coupling is important to assess impact of code changes. In particular, it may be critical for security that some secret data does not leak publicly, which can be rephrased as saying that only the specified data dependencies are allowed. SPARK is ideally equiped to support such analysis, with its detailed Subprogram Contracts:
With Data Dependencies, a user can specify exactly the input and output data of a subprogram, which identifies the “data not exclusively under the control of that software component”:
When taking the subprogram as component, any variable in the data dependencies is in general not exclusively under the control of that software component.
When taking the unit (or sets of units) as component, any variable in the data dependencies that is not defined in the unit itself (or the set of units) is in general not exclusively under the control of that software component.
With Flow Dependencies, a user can specify the nature of the “dependence of a software component on data not exclusively under the control of that software component”, by identifying how that data may influence specific outputs of a subprogram.
With Flow Dependencies, a user can also specify how “one software component influences the execution of another software component”, by identifying the shared data potentially written by the subprogram.
With functional contracts (Preconditions and Postconditions), a user can specify very precisely the behavior of the subprogram, which defines how it “influences the execution of another software component”. These contracts need not be complete, for example they could describe the precedence order rules for calling various subprograms.
When using data and flow dependencies, GNATprove’s flow analysis is sufficient to check that the program implements its specifications. When using functional contracts, GNATprove’s proof should also be applied.
8.2.8. Ensure Portability of Programs¶
Using SPARK enhances portability of programs by excluding language features that are known to cause portability problems, and by making it possible to obtain guarantees that specific portability problems cannot occur. In particular, analyses of SPARK code can prove the absence of run-time errors in the program, and that specified functional properties always hold.
Still, porting a SPARK program written for a given compiler and target to another compiler and/or target may require changes in the program. As SPARK is a subset of Ada, and because in general only some parts of a complete program are in SPARK, we need to consider first the issue of portability in the context of Ada, and then specialize it in the context of SPARK.
Note that we consider here portability in its strictest sense, whereby a program is portable if its observable behavior is exactly the same across a change of compiler and/or target. In the more common sense of the word, a program is portable if it can be reused without modification on a different target, or when changing compiler. That is consistent with the definition of portability in WikiPedia: “Portability in high-level computer programming is the usability of the same software in different environments”. As an example of a difference between both interpretations, many algorithms which use trigonometry are portable in the more common sense, not in the strictest sense.
184.108.40.206. Portability of Ada Programs¶
Programs with errors cause additional portability issues not seen in programs without errors, which is why we consider them separately.
Portability of Programs Without Errors¶
The Ada Reference Manual defines precisely which features of the language depend on choices made by the compiler (see Ada RM 1.1.3 “Conformity of an Implementation with the Standard”):
Implementation defined behavior - The set of possible behaviors is specified in the language, and the particular behavior chosen in a compiler should be documented. An example of implementation defined behavior is the size of predefined integer types (like
Integer). All implementation defined behaviors are listed in Ada RM M.2, and GNAT documents its implementation for each of these points in section 7 “Implementation Defined Characteristics” of the GNAT Reference Manual.
Unspecified behavior - The set of possible behaviors is specified in the language, but the particular behavior chosen in a compiler need not be documented. An example of unspecified behavior is the order of evaluation of arguments in a subprogram call.
Changes of compiler and/or target may lead to different implementation defined and unspecified behavior, which may or not have a visible effect. For example, changing the order of evaluation of arguments in a subprogram call only has a visible effect if the evaluation of arguments itself has some side-effects.
Section 18.4 “Implementation-dependent characteristics” of the GNAT Reference Manual gives some advice on how to address implementation defined behavior for portability.
A particular issue is that the Ada Reference Manual gives much implementation freedom to the compiler in the implementation of operations of fixed-point and floating-point types:
The small of a fixed-point type is implementation defined (Ada RM 3.5.9(8/2)) unless specified explicitly.
The base type of a fixed-point type is implementation defined (Ada RM 3.5.9(12-16)), which has an impact on possible overflows.
The rounded result of an ordinary fixed-point multiplication or division is implementation defined (Ada RM G.2.3(10)).
For some combinations of types of operands and results for fixed-point multiplication and division, the value of the result belongs to an implementation defined set of values (Ada RM G.2.3(5)).
The semantics of operations on floating-point types is implementation defined (Ada RM G.2). It may or may not follow the IEEE 754 floating point standard.
The precision of elementary functions (exponential and trigonometric functions) is implementation defined (Ada RM G.2.4).
Section 18.1 “Writing Portable Fixed-Point Declarations” of the GNAT Reference Manual gives some advice on how to reduce implementation defined behavior for fixed-point types. Use of IEEE 754 floating-point arithmetic can be enforced in GNAT by using the compilation switches “-msse2 -mfpmath=sse”, as documented in section 220.127.116.11 “Floating Point Operations” of the GNAT User’s Guide.
Note that a number of restrictions can be used to prevent some features leading to implementation defined or unspecified behavior:
No_Fixed_Pointforbids the use of fixed-point types.
No_Floating_Pointforbids the use of floating-point types.
No_Implementation_Aspect_Specificationsforbids the use of implementation defined aspects.
No_Implementation_Attributesforbids the use of implementation defined attributes.
No_Implementation_Pragmasforbids the use of implementation defined pragmas.
SPARK defines a few constructs (aspects, pragmas and attributes) that are not defined in Ada. While GNAT supports these constructs, care should be exercised to use these constructs with other compilers, or older versions of GNAT. This issue is detailed in section Portability Issues.
Portability of Programs With Errors¶
In addition to the portability issues discussed so far, programs with errors cause specific portability issues related to whether errors are detected and how they are reported. The Ada Reference Manual distinguishes between four types of errors (see Ada RM 1.1.5 “Classification of Errors”):
Compile-time errors - These errors make a program illegal, and should be detected by any Ada compiler. They do not cause any portability issue, as they must be fixed before compilation.
Run-time errors - These errors are signaled by raising an exception at run time. They might be a cause of portability problems, as a change of compiler and/or target may lead to new run-time errors. For example, a new compiler may cause the program to use more stack space, leading to an exception
Storage_Error, and a new target may change the size of standard integer types, leading to an exception
Bounded errors - These errors need not be detected either at compiler time or at run time, but their effects should be bounded. For example, reading an uninitialized value may result in any value of the type to be used, or to
Program_Errorbeing raised. Like for run-time errors, they might be a cause of portability problems, as a change of compiler and/or target may lead to new bounded errors.
Erroneous execution - For the remaining errors, a program exhibits erroneous execution, which means that the error need not be detected, and its effects are not bounded by the language rules. These errors might be a cause of portability problems.
Portability issues may arise in a number of cases related to errors:
The original program has an error that is not detected (a run-time error, bounded error or erroneous execution). Changing the compiler and/or target causes the error to be detected (an exception is raised) or to trigger a different behavior. Typically, reads of uninitialized data or illegal accesses to memory that are not detected in the original program may result in errors when changing the compiler and/or the target.
The original program has no error, but changing the compiler and/or target causes an error to appear, which may or not be detected. Typically, uses of low-level constructs like
Unchecked_Conversionwhich depend on the exact representation of values in bits may lead to errors when changing the compiler and/or the target. Some run-time errors like overflow errors or storage errors are also particularly sensitive to compiler and target changes.
To avoid portability issues, errors should be avoided by using suitable analyses and reviews in the context of the original and the new compiler and/or target. Whenever possible, these analyses and reviews should be automated by tools to guarantee that all possible errors of a given kind have been reported.
18.104.22.168. Benefits of Using SPARK for Portability¶
By excluding side-effects in expressions, SPARK programs cannot suffer from effects occurring in different orders depending on the order of evaluation of expressions chosen by the compiler.
By excluding aliasing, the behavior of SPARK programs does not depend on the parameter passing mechanism (by copy or by reference) or the order of assignment to out and in-out parameters passed by copy after the call, which are both chosen by the compiler.
By excluding controlled types, SPARK programs cannot suffer from the presence and ordering of effects taking place as part of the initialization, assignment and finalization of controlled objects, which depend on choices made by the compiler.
As permitted by the SPARK language rules (see section 1.4.1 “Further Details
on Formal Verification” of the SPARK Reference Manual), GNATprove rejects
with an error programs which may implicitly raise a
Program_Error in parts
of code that are in SPARK. For example, all static execution paths in a
SPARK function should end with a return statement, a raise statement, or a
pragma Assert (False). GNATprove’s analysis can be further used to ensure
that dynamic executions can only end in a return.
GNATprove reduces portability issues related to the use of fixed-point and floating-point values:
GNATprove supports a subset of fixed-point types and operations that ensures that the result of an operation always belongs to the perfect result set as defined in Ada RM G.2.3. Note that the perfect result set still contains in general two values (the two model fixed-point values above and below the perfect mathematical result), which means that two compilers may give two different results for multiplication and division. Users should thus avoid multiplication and division of fixed-point values for maximal portability. See Tool Limitations.
GNATprove assumes IEEE 754 standard semantics for basic operations of floating-point types (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division). With GNAT, this is achieved by using compilation switches “-msse2 -mfpmath=sse”. Users should still avoid elementary functions (exponential and trigonometric functions) for maximal portability. See Semantics of Floating Point Operations.
Additionally, GNATprove can detect all occurrences of specific portability
issues in SPARK code (that is, parts of the program for which
SPARK_Mode=On is specified, see section on Identifying SPARK Code)
when run in specific modes (see Effect of Mode on Output for a
description of the different modes):
In all modes (including mode
check), when switch
--pedanticis set, GNATprove issues a warning for every arithmetic operation which could be re-ordered by the compiler, thus leading to a possible overflow with one compiler and not another. For example, arithmetic operation
A + B + Ccan be interpreted as
(A + B) + Cby one compiler, and
A + (B + C)(after re-ordering) by another compiler. Note that GNAT always uses the former version without re-ordering. See Parenthesized Arithmetic Operations.
all, GNATprove issues high check messages on possible parameter aliasing, when such an aliasing may lead to interferences. This includes all cases where the choice of parameter passing mechanism in a compiler (by copy or by reference) might influence the behavior of the subprogram. See Absence of Interferences.
all, GNATprove issues check messages on possible reads of uninitialized data. These messages should be reviewed with respect to the stricter Data Initialization Policy in SPARK rather than in Ada. Hence, it is possible when the program does not conform to the stricter SPARK rules to manually validate them, see section Justifying Check Messages.
all, GNATprove issues check messages on all possible run-time errors corresponding to raising exception
Constraint_Errorat run time, all possible failures of assertions corresponding to raising exception
Assert_Errorat run time, and all possible explicit raising of exceptions in the program.
The analysis of GNATprove can take into account characteristics of the target (size and alignment of standard scalar types, endianness) by specifying a Target Parameterization.
22.214.171.124. How to Use SPARK for Portability¶
GNATprove’s analysis may be used to enhance the portability of programs. Note that the guarantees provided by this analysis only hold for the source program. To ensure that these guarantees extend to the executable object code, one should independently provide assurance that the object code correctly implements the semantics of the source code.
Avoiding Non-Portable Features¶
As much as possible, uses of non-portable language features should be avoided, or at least isolated in specific parts of the program to facilitate analyses and reviews when changing the compiler and/or the target.
This includes in particular language features that deal with machine addresses,
data representations, interfacing with assembler code, and similar issues (for
example, language attribute
Size). When changing the compiler and/or the
target, the program logic should be carefully reviewed for possible dependences
on the original compiler behavior and/or original target characteristics. See
also the section 18.4.5 “Target-specific aspects” of the GNAT Reference
In particular, features that bypass the type system of Ada for reinterpreting
Unchecked_Conversion) and memory locations (
overlays, in which multiple objects are defined to share the same address,
something that can also be achieved by sharing the same
External_Name) have no impact on SPARK analysis, yet they may lead to
By using the following restrictions (or a subset thereof), one can ensure that the corresponding non-portable features are not used in the program:
pragma No_Dependence (Ada.Unchecked_Conversion); pragma No_Dependence (System.Machine_code);
Similarly, the program logic should be carefully reviewed for possible dependency on target characteristics (for example, the size of standard integer types). GNATprove’s analysis may help here as it can take into account the characteristics of the target. Hence, proofs of functional properties with GNATprove ensure that these properties will always hold on the target.
In the specific case that the target is changing, it might be useful to run
GNATprove’s analysis on the program in
proof mode, even if it cannot
prove completely the absence of run-time errors and that the specified
functional properties (if any) hold. Indeed, by running GNATprove twice, once
with the original target and once with the new target, comparing the results
obtained in both cases might point to parts of the code that are impacted by
the change of target, which may require more detailed manual reviews.
Apart from non-portable language features and target characteristics, non-portability in SPARK may come from a small list of causes:
Possible re-ordering of non-parenthesized arithmetic operations. These can be detected by running GNATprove (see Benefits of Using SPARK for Portability). Then, either these operations may not be re-ordered by the compiler (for example, GNAT ensures this property), or re-ordering may not lead to an intermediate overflow (for example, if the base type is large enough), or the user may introduce parentheses to prevent re-ordering.
Possible aliasing between parameters (or parameters and global variables) of a call causing interferences. These can be detected by running GNATprove (see Benefits of Using SPARK for Portability). Then, either aliasing is not possible in reality, or aliasing may not cause different behaviors depending on the parameter passing mechanism chosen in the compiler, or the user may change the code to avoid aliasing. When SPARK subprograms are called from non-SPARK code (for example Ada or C code), manual reviews should be performed to ensure that these calls cannot introduce aliasing between parameters, or between parameters and global variables.
Possible different choices of base type for user-defined integer types (contrary to derived types or subtypes, which inherit their base type from their parent type). GNATprove follows GNAT in choosing as base type the smallest multiple-words-size integer type that contains the type bounds (see Base Type of User-Defined Integer Types for more information).
Issues related to errors. See section Avoiding Errors to Enhance Portability.
Issues related to the use of fixed-point or floating-point operations. See section Portability of Fixed-Point and Floating-Point Computations below.
Avoiding Errors to Enhance Portability¶
Because errors in a program make portability particularly challenging (see Portability of Programs With Errors), it is important to ensure that a program is error-free for portability. GNATprove’s analysis can help by ensuring that the SPARK parts of a program are free from broad kinds of errors:
all possible reads of uninitialized data
all possible explicit raise of exceptions in the program
all possible run-time errors except raising exception
Storage_Error, corresponding to raising exception
Tasking_Errorat run time
all possible failures of assertions corresponding to raising exception
Assert_Errorat run time
When parts of the program are not in SPARK (for example, in Ada or C), the results of GNATprove’s analysis depend on assumptions on the correct behavior of the non-SPARK code. For example, callers of a SPARK subprogram should only pass initialized input values, and non-SPARK subprograms called from SPARK code should respect their postcondition. See section Managing Assumptions for more details on assumptions.
In particular, when changing the target characteristics, GNATprove’s analysis can be used to show that no possible overflow can occur as a result of changing the size of standard integer types.
GNATprove’s analysis does not detect possible run-time errors corresponding
to raising exception
Storage_Error at run time, which should be
Portability of Fixed-Point and Floating-Point Computations¶
Portability issues related to the use of fixed-point or floating-point operations can be avoided altogether by ensuring that the program does not use fixed-point or floating-point values, using:
pragma Restrictions (No_Fixed_Point); pragma Restrictions (No_Floating_Point);
When fixed-point values are used, the value of the small and size in bits for the type should be specified explicitly, as documented in section 18.1 “Writing Portable Fixed-Point Declarations” of the GNAT Reference Manual:
My_Small : constant := 2.0**(-15); My_First : constant := -1.0; My_Last : constant := +1.0 - My_Small; type F2 is delta My_Small range My_First .. My_Last; for F2'Small use my_Small; for F2'Size use 16;
The program should also avoid multiplication and division of fixed-point values to ensure that the result of arithmetic operations is exactly defined.
When floating-point values are used, use of IEEE 754 standard semantics for basic operations of floating-point types (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division) should be enforced. With GNAT, this is achieved by using compilation switches “-msse2 -mfpmath=sse”.
The program should also avoid elementary functions (exponential and trigonometric functions), which can be ensured with a restriction:
pragma No_Dependence (Ada.Numerics);
If elementary functions are used, subject to reviews for ensuring portability, GNATprove’s proof results may depend on the fact that elementary functions can be modeled as mathematical functions of their inputs that always return the same result when taking the same values in arguments. GNAT compiler was modified to ensure this property (see https://blog.adacore.com/how-our-compiler-learnt-from-our-analyzers), which may not hold for other Ada compilers.
8.3. Project Scenarios¶
The workflow for using SPARK depends not only on the chosen Objectives of Using SPARK, but also on the context in which SPARK is used: Is it for a new development? Or an evolution of an existing codebase? Is the existing codebase in Ada or in a version of SPARK prior to SPARK 2014? We examine all these project scenarios in this section.
8.3.1. Maintenance and Evolution of Existing Ada Software¶
Although SPARK is a large subset of Ada, it contains a number of Language Restrictions which prevent in general direct application of GNATprove to an existing Ada codebase without any modifications. The suggested workflow is to:
Identify violations of SPARK restrictions.
For each violation, either rewrite the code in SPARK or mark it
SPARK_Mode => Off(see section on Identifying SPARK Code).
Perform the required analyses to achieve the desired objectives (see section on Formal Verification with GNATprove), a process which likely involved writing contracts (see in particular section on How to Write Subprogram Contracts).
Make sure that the assumptions made for formal verification are justified at the boundary between SPARK and full Ada code (see section on Managing Assumptions).
126.96.36.199. Identifying Violations of SPARK Restrictions¶
A simple way to identify violations of SPARK restrictions is by Setting the Default SPARK_Mode to
SPARK_Mode => On, and then running GNATprove
check mode (to report basic violations) or in
flow mode (to
report violations whose detection requires flow analysis).
Finally, one may prefer to work her way through the project one unit at a time by Using SPARK_Mode in Code, and running GNATprove on the current unit only.
188.8.131.52. Rewriting the Code in SPARK¶
Depending on the violation, it may be more or less easy to rewrite the code in SPARK:
General access types should in general be rewritten as private types of a package whose public part is marked
SPARK_Mode => Onand whose private part is marked
SPARK_Mode => Off. Thus, the body of that package cannot be analyzed by GNATprove, but clients of the package can be analyzed.
Functions with side-effects should be rewritten as procedures, by adding an additional out parameter for the result of the function.
Aliasing should be either explicitly signed off by Justifying Check Messages or removed by introducing a copy of the object to pass as argument to the call.
Controlled types cannot be rewritten easily.
Top-level exception handlers can be moved to a wrapper subprogram, which calls the subprogram without handlers and handles the exceptions which may be raised. The callee subprogram (and any callers) can thus be analyzed by GNATprove, while the body of the wrapper subprogram is marked
SPARK_Mode => Off. The same result can be obtained for exception handlers not at top-level by first refactoring the corresponding block into a subprogram.
SPARK_Mode to Select or Exclude Code¶
Depending on the number and location of remaining violations,
can be used in different ways:
If most of the codebase is in SPARK, Setting the Default SPARK_Mode to
SPARK_Mode => Onis best. Violations should be isolated in parts of the code marked
SPARK_Mode => Offby either Excluding Selected Unit Bodies or Excluding Selected Parts of a Unit.
Even when most of the code is in SPARK, it may be more cost effective to apply
SPARK_Mode => Onselectively rather than by default. This is the case in particular when some units have non-SPARK declarations in the public part of their package spec (for example general access type definitions). Rewriting the code of these units to isolate the non-SPARK declarations in a part that can be marked
SPARK_Mode => Offmay be more costly than specifying no
SPARK_Modefor these units, which allows SPARK code elsewhere in the program to refer to the SPARK entities in these units.
When analyzing a unit for the first time, it may help to gradually mark the
SPARK_Mode => On:
Start with the unit spec marked
SPARK_Mode => Onand the unit body marked
SPARK_Mode => Off. First run GNATprove in
flowmode, then in
proofmode, until all errors are resolved (some unproved checks may remain, as errors and checks are different Categories of Messages).
Continue with the both the unit spec and body marked
SPARK_Mode => On. First run GNATprove in
flowmode, then in
proofmode, until all errors are resolved.
Now that GNATprove can analyze the unit without any errors, continue with whatever analysis is required to achieve the desired objectives.
184.108.40.206. Choosing Which Run-time Checking to Keep¶
Inside proven SPARK code, no run-time errors of the kinds that GNATprove targets can be raised (see Avoiding Errors to Enhance Portability for details), provided the analysis assumptions are respected. See section Managing Assumptions for more details on assumptions. In such proven code, it is possible to remove run-time checking as described in section Safe Optimization of Run-Time Checks.
Note that GNATprove’s analysis does not detect possible run-time errors
corresponding to raising exception
Storage_Error at run time. As described
in “GNAT User’s Guide for Native Platforms”, section 6.6.1 on “Stack Overflow
-fstack-check can be used to activate stack
An important use case is the one of unproven code calling proven code, typically when rewriting core components of the application in SPARK. In that case, the guarantees provided by proof on SPARK code rely on the following main assumptions:
The preconditions of proven SPARK subprograms should be respected. If these subprograms can be called from subprograms that are not proved, it is recommended to activate their preconditions at run time with Pragma Assertion_Policy, as shown in Writing Contracts for Program Integrity.
All inputs of proven SPARK subprograms should have valid values for their types. This is enforced by the combination of flow analysis and proof in SPARK code, both for parameters and global variables that are read in the subprogram. It can be partially verified (for parameters but not global variables) during testing for calls from unproven subprograms by compiling the program with special switches to add run-time checks related to validity, as described in section Between Proof and Unit Testing.
Inputs and outputs that may interfere should not be aliased. See section Absence of Interferences for details. Similar to validity, it can be partially verified (for parameters but not global variables) during testing for calls from unproven subprograms by compiling the program with special switch
-gnateA, as described in section Between Proof and Unit Testing.
Inside unproven code, users may opt for keeping run-time checking and/or
assertion checking in the executable or not, depending on their overall error
detection and recovery policy. At the level of a compilation unit, this choice
can be made through compilation switch
-gnatp (for suppressing run-time
-gnata (for activating assertion checking). These choices can
be reversed for a selected piece of code with pragmas
Unsuppress (for all checks) and
Assertion_Policy (for assertions only).
Additional compilation switches that activate validity checking are best kept for verification, as described in section Between Proof and Unit Testing. Activating them in the final executable may lead to large increases in running time, with some checks being inserted at unexpected/extra places, as these validity checks do not follow a formal definition like the one found in Ada Reference Manual for other run-time checks.
8.3.2. New Developments in SPARK¶
In this scenario, a significant part of a software (possibly a module, possibly the whole software) is developed in SPARK. Typically, SPARK is used for the most critical parts of the software, with less critical parts programmed in Ada, C or Java (for example the graphical interface). A typical development process for this scenario might be:
Produce the high level (architectural) design in terms of package specifications. Determine which packages will be in SPARK, to be marked
SPARK_Mode => On.
Alternatively, if the majority of packages are to be SPARK, Setting the Default SPARK_Mode to
SPARK_Mode => Onis best. Those few units that are not SPARK should be marked
SPARK_Mode => Off.
Add Package Contracts to SPARK packages and, depending on the desired objectives, add relevant Subprogram Contracts to the subprograms declared in these packages. The package contracts should identify the key elements of State Abstraction which might also be referred to in Data Dependencies and Flow Dependencies.
Begin implementing the package bodies. One typical method of doing this is to use a process of top-down decomposition, starting with a top-level subprogram specification and implementing the body by breaking it down into further (nested) subprograms which are themselves specified but not yet implemented, and to iterate until a level is reached where it is appropriate to start writing executable code. However the exact process is not mandated and will depend on other factors such as the design methodology being employed. Provided unimplemented subprograms are stubbed (that is, they are given dummy bodies), GNATprove can be used at any point to analyze the program.
As each subprogram is implemented, GNATprove can be used (in mode
proofdepending on the objectives) to verify it (against its contract, and/or to show absence of run-time errors).
8.3.3. Conversion of Existing SPARK Software to SPARK 2014¶
If an existing piece of software has been developed in a previous version of SPARK and is still undergoing active development/maintenance then it may be advantageous to upgrade to using SPARK 2014 in order to make use of the larger language subset and the new tools and environment. This requires more efforts than previous upgrades between versions of SPARK (SPARK 83, SPARK 95 and SPARK 2005) because the new version SPARK 2014 of SPARK is incompatible with those previous versions of the language. While the programming language itself in those previous versions of SPARK is a strict subset of SPARK 2014, the contracts and assertions in previous versions of SPARK are expressed as stylized comments that are ignored by GNATprove. Instead, those contracts and assertions should be expressed as executable Ada constructs, as presented in the Overview of SPARK Language.
The SPARK Language Reference Manual has an appendix containing a SPARK 2005 to SPARK 2014 Mapping Specification which can be used to guide the conversion process. Various options can be considered for the conversion process:
Only convert annotations into contracts and assertions, with minimal changes to the executable code - Note that some changes to the code may be required when converting annotations, for example adding with-clauses in a unit to give visibility over entities used in contracts in this unit but defined in another units (which was performed in previous versions of SPARK with
inheritannotations). This conversion should be relatively straightforward by following the mapping of features between the two languages.
The SPARK tools should be used to analyze the work in progress throughout the conversion process (which implies that a bottom-up approach may work best) and any errors corrected as they are found. This may also be an occasion to dramatically simplify annotations, as GNATprove requires far fewer of them. See the description of the conversion of SPARKSkein program in the section about Examples in the Toolset Distribution, for which a majority of the annotations are not needed anymore.
Once the conversion is complete, development and maintenance can continue in SPARK.
In addition to converting annotations, benefit from the larger language and more powerful tools to simplify code and contracts - SPARK 2014 is far less constraining than previous versions of SPARK in terms of dependencies between units (which can form a graph instead of a tree), control structures (for example arbitrary return statements and exit statements are allowed), data structures (for example scalar types with dynamic bounds are allowed), expressions (for example local variables can be initialized with non-static expressions at declaration). In addition, useful new language constructs are available:
Contract Cases can be used to replace complex postconditions with implications.
Predicates can be used to state invariant properties of subtypes, so that they need not be repeated in preconditions, postconditions, loop invariants, etc.
Expression Functions can be used to replace simple query functions and their postcondition.
Ghost Code can be used to mark code only used for verification.
Loop Variants can be used to prove the termination of loops.
Changing the code to use these new features may favor readability and maintenance. These changes can be performed either while converting annotations, or as a second stage after all annotations have been converted (the case discussed above). Like in the previous case, the SPARK tools should be used to analyze the work in progress throughout the conversion process (which implies that a bottom-up approach may work best) and any errors corrected as they are found. Once the conversion is complete, development and maintenance can continue in SPARK.
Gradually convert annotations and code - It is possible to keep annotations in comments for the previous versions of SPARK while gradually adding contracts and assertions in SPARK 2014. The latest version of the SPARK 2005 toolset facilitates this gradual migration by ignoring SPARK pragmas. Thus, new contracts (for example Preconditions and Postconditions) should be expressed as pragmas rather than aspects in that case.
Typically, annotations and code would be converted when it needs to be changed. The granularity of how much code needs to be converted when a module is touched should be considered, and is likely to be at the level of the whole package.
The latest version of the SPARK 2005 toolset can be used to continue analyzing the parts of the program that do not use the new features of SPARK 2014, including units which have the two versions of contracts in parallel. GNATprove can be used to analyze parts of the program that have contracts in SPARK 2014 syntax, including units which have the two versions of contracts in parallel.
Note that some users may wish to take advantage of the new SPARK contracts
and tools whilst retaining the more restrictive nature of SPARK 2005. (Many of
the restrictions from SPARK 2005 have been lifted in SPARK because
improvements in the tools mean that sound analysis can be performed without
them, but some projects may need to operate in a more constrained environment.)
This can be achieved using
pragma Restrictions (SPARK_05). For further
details of this restriction please see the GNAT Reference Manual.
8.3.4. Analysis of Frozen Ada Software¶
In some very specific cases, users may be interested in the results of GNATprove’s analysis on an unmodified code. This may be the case for example if the only objective is to Ensure Portability of Programs for existing Ada programs that cannot be modified (due to some certification or legal constraints).
In such a case, the suggested workflow is very similar to the one described for
Maintenance and Evolution of Existing Ada Software, except the code
cannot be rewritten when a violation of SPARK restrictions is encountered,
and instead that part of the code should be marked
SPARK_Mode => Off. To
minimize the parts of the code that need to be marked
SPARK_Mode => Off, it
is in general preferable to apply
SPARK_Mode => On selectively rather than
by default, so that units that have non-SPARK declarations in the public part
of their package spec (for example general access type definitions) need not be
SPARK_Mode => Off. See
Using SPARK_Mode to Select or Exclude Code for details.